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ABSTRACT
The post-Soviet area is a home for a several de facto states, which are entities that resemble “normal” 
states but lack international recognition. This paper examines a historical and under-researched case study 
of the Gagauz Republic (Gagauzia), a de facto state that existed within Moldova between 1990 and 1995. 
Drawing on a new suite of sources – interviews, memoirs and journalism – it analyses the territorial, mil-
itary, political, and socio-economic dimensions of the Gagauz de facto statehood, tracing how the Gagauz 
authorities proceeded in consolidating Gagauzia’s statehood through processes of state- and nation-building. 
This study concludes that the Gagauz leadership was moderately successful in its activities.
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INTRODUCTION
The post-Soviet area is a home for six de facto states: Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karab-
akh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, as well as, in a historical perspective, Chechnya 
and the Gagauz Republic (Gagauzia). In short, de facto states resemble “normal” 
states except for one difference: they lack international recognition or enjoy it only 
* The author would like to thank all persons interviewed during field research conducted in Moldova 
and Ukraine. Many of interviews were facilitated by Elena Cuijuclu from the Comrat State University, 
for which she deserves sincere thanks. The author also thanks: Mick Frogley for his support in editing the 
paper, Jakub Pieńkowski for drawing the map and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.
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at a minimal level. This means that their territories formally belong to universally 
recognised states – in the above-mentioned cases, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and 
Russia – although in reality the authorities of these parent states have no or limited 
control over their breakaway regions.
This article focuses on the Gagauz Republic established on the territory of 
Moldova by the Gagauz – Turkic-speaking Orthodox Christians. Having declared 
its independence from the then Soviet republic of Moldova on August 19, 1990, 
Gagauzia was the first Eurasian de facto state. De facto independence was achieved 
quickly, when Gagauzia endured Moldova’s attempt to crush it by force at the end 
of October 1990.1 Further, Gagauzia was the only Eurasian de facto state to be vol-
untarily reintegrated by a parent state, becoming the Autonomous Territorial Unit 
of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri) within independent Moldova. Striking a deal with the 
Gagauz leadership, Moldova’s parliament adopted a proper bill in December 1994, 
while the territory, governor (bashkan), and legislative body of autonomous Gagau-
zia were determined by popular vote in the following months in 1995. The newly 
elected authorities inaugurated their work in June 1995 taking over power from the 
Gagauz Republic’s leadership.2
While the body of literature on internal developments in present Eurasian de 
facto states is growing [for example, Kolstø, Blakkisrud 2008; Blakkisrud, Kolstø 
2011, 2012; Ó Beacháin et al. 2016] and a historical case of Chechnya afforded con-
sideration [Tishkov 2004; Graney 2004], the Gagauz Republic is largely overlooked. 
Although the Gagauz national movement and its conflict with the central Moldovan 
authorities have been reasonably well investigated [Batt 1997; King 1997; Chinn, 
Roper 1998; Thompson 1998; Webster 2007; Zabarah 2011, 2012], only a fragmen-
tary and often contradictory account of the internal dynamics in the Gagauz Republic 
is given in the literature, and there are actually only two short works – written by 
Petr Shornikov and Stepan Bulgar [Shornikov 2006; Shornikov, Bulgar 2006] – that 
pay more detailed attention to this problem. 
This paper aims to contribute to the scholarship on de facto states by examin-
ing how the Gagauz authorities proceeded in consolidating Gagauzia’s statehood 
1 Caspersen [2012: 12] and Florea [2014: 793] designate Gagauzia as a de facto state since 1991. 
They may point to the fact that Gagauzia announced independence only from Soviet Moldova, wanting to 
remain a part of the Soviet Union. Therefore, they may argue that Gagauzia de facto became an indepen-
dent entity only when the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991. However, it can be argued that 
the Gagauz Republic was de facto independent from the Soviet Union as well. At the turn of the 1980s 
and 1990s, Moscow’s control over its territory was waning, while the level of power and independence of 
Soviet republics, including those that were self-proclaimed, gradually increased. Accordingly, Kaufman 
[2001: 154] points out that by the summer of 1990, “Moscow was reduced more and more to the role of 
an outside intervener rather than a sovereign authority” in a conflict between Moldova and Gagauzia (and 
Transnistria). 
2 Caspersen [2012: 12] and Florea [2014: 793] point respectively at 1994 and 1995 as the years 
when Gagauzia ceased to be a de facto state. The date when the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia 
(Gagauz Yeri) was de facto established, i.e. (June) 1995, is a more appropriate end date for the de facto 
Gagauz state.
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through processes of state- and nation-building. Nina Caspersen [2012: 52] divides 
a state-building into a few, frequently overlapping phases: 1. Expelling representa-
tives of a parent state and establishing physical control over (most of) the claimed 
territory; 2. Establishing a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (including 
subordination of warlords) and credible military defence capabilities; 3. Providing 
basic public services to a population, not just internal and external security: this, 
in fact, relates to phase 2, but also such services as water and electricity, health 
and education. These processes are accompanied by nation-building, i.e. construct-
ing a shared identity and a sense of unity in a de facto state’s population [Kolstø, 
Blakkisrud 2008: 485]. In turn, advancements in state- and nation-building shape 
the legitimacy of a de facto state in the eyes of its population [Bakke et al. 2014: 
592–594]. This article traces state- and nation-building processes by examining four 
domestic – i.e. the territorial, military, political, and socio-economic – dimensions 
of Gagauzia’s de facto statehood.
The paper also aims to define the results of state consolidation efforts undertaken 
by Gagauzia’s authorities. By putting Gagauzia on the list of de facto states, Nina 
Caspersen, Gareth Stansfield and Adrian Florea [Caspersen, Stansfield 2011: 3–4; 
Caspersen 2012: 11–12; Florea 2014: 791–793] acknowledge that this entity estab-
lished control over (most of) the claimed territory. This view has supporters in the lit-
erature [Batt 1997: 40; Neukirch 2002: 107–108; Chinn, Roper 1998: 95; Thompson 
1998: 135]. However, this and other state- and (presumably) nation-building efforts 
undertaken by Gagauzia’s leaders are also frequently challenged in the literature. 
Steven D. Roper [2001: 117] claims that the assertion of Moldova’s sovereignty over 
the Gagauz area was not seriously contested. Paul Kubicek [2010: 291] explains that 
Gagauzia’s “protogovernment lacked the means to exercise control over the five dis-
tricts under its purported administration”. Similarly, Charles King [2000: 217] notes 
that the Gagauz region’s sustenance depended on funding from Moldova’s central 
budget. Accordingly, Sergey Markedonov [2015: 201] sees the Gagauz Republic 
as a failed de facto state, while Donnacha Ó Beacháin et al. [2016: 441] do not put 
Gagauzia on a list of Eurasian de facto states at all. Whereas this paper identifies 
deficiencies in state- and nation- building, it nevertheless concludes that the Gagauz 
authorities were moderately successful in consolidating Gagauzia’s statehood.
The study is based predominantly on three kinds of sources. Firstly, there are 
thirty-five semi-structured interviews, mainly conducted with the leadership of the 
Gagauz Republic and activists of the Gagauz national movement. Secondly, the 
paper employs memoirs written by Mikhail Kendigelian [2009], a chairman of the 
Gagauz Republic’s parliament, and by Stepan Topal [2013], the Republic’s pres-
ident.3 Thirdly, the study draws on newspapers published at the turn of the 1980s 
3 Only the most important offices held by interviewees during the existence of the Gagauz Republic 
are mentioned in the paper. Proper names are provided in the text in their Russian, transliterated versions 
due to linguistic Russification of the Gagauz, whereas toponyms are provided in Moldovan (Romanian).
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and 1990s in four out of five of Moldova’s districts, whose parts comprised the 
Gagauz de facto state: Leninskoe slovo/Komratskie Vesti – KV (Comrat), Znamia 
(Ceadîr-Lunga), Panorama (Vulcănești), and Svet oktiabria – SO (Taraclia). This 
article starts by presenting the origins of the Gagauz Republic. Next, it analyses the 
territorial, military, political, and socio-economic dimensions of Gagauzia’s de facto 
statehood, tracing processes of state- and nation-building. Finally, in a concluding 
section, it discusses how successful the Gagauz authorities were in consolidating 
Gagauzia’s statehood.
ORIGINS OF THE GAGAUZ REPUBLIC4
The ethnic origin of the Gagauz is unclear. One of many hypotheses claims that 
they are Bulgarianised Turks, while another says they are Turkicised Bulgarians. 
What is widely accepted is that they resettled together with Bulgarians originating 
from Dobrudja (now in Bulgaria and Romania) to southern Bessarabia, known also 
as Budjak (now in Moldova and Ukraine) in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century. This region was a part of the Russian Empire, then Romania and finally the 
Soviet Union. It was the Soviet republic of Moldova that became a home for the 
majority of the Gagauz people worldwide. 
Despite the fact that under the rule of the Soviet Union the Gagauz advanced 
socially and economically, they were one of the most disadvantaged ethnic groups 
in Soviet Moldova. What enabled their national rebirth was perestroika, a pro-
gramme of restructuring the Soviet Union launched in 1986 by Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev. The point was to preserve and foster their culture and boost economic 
development of their backward agricultural region. The Gagauz believed that their 
problems would be resolved if they were granted territorial autonomy within the 
Soviet republic of Moldova.
However, to the disadvantage of the Gagauz, the Moldovan national movement 
– led by the Popular Front of Moldova – grew more powerful and radical. It led to 
the adoption of language laws in autumn 1989 that granted official language status 
to Moldovan written in Latin script (which was, in fact, identical to Romanian). This 
move played against the dominantly Russian- or Gagauz-speaking Gagauz popula-
tion, potentially jeopardising employment. Further, the Popular Front took power 
in Moldova in the aftermath of the 1990 parliamentary elections. New Moldovan 
national symbols were adopted, modelled on those of Romania, while the radical 
wing of the Popular Front was openly in favour of full reunion. The issue for the 
Gagauz was that the period when Moldova (Bessarabia) was a part of Romania was 
remembered in their collective memory as time of occupation and national oppres-
sion. The Popular Front also radicalised its position towards national minorities. 
4 This section is based on works by Webster [2007], Shornikov [2006] and Zabarah [2011].
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These moves unsettled the Gagauz population and challenged the vested interests 
of local elites, consolidating the Gagauz national movement and strengthening the 
need for territorial autonomy (additionally guaranteeing internationalism and the 
official status not only for Gagauz, but also for the Russian language). 
Despite growing tensions between Moldovans and the Gagauz, in August of 1989, 
they started a formal discussion on the question of Gagauz autonomy within Soviet 
Moldova. In order to press the Moldovans and push the autonomy issue forward, the 
Gagauz proclaimed the Gagauz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on November 
12, 1989. Although they then sought formal recognition from the Moldovan Supreme 
Soviet, their declaration was swiftly overturned and ruled illegal. Ultimately, on July 
27, 1990, the Moldovan Supreme Soviet, controlled by the Popular Front of Moldo-
va, refused to grant territorial autonomy to the Gagauz as a non-indigenous ethnic 
group and ruled that they had no rights to Moldova’s land. The Gagauz, represented 
by people’s deputies at all levels from the Gagauz area (from villages to the Soviet 
Union’s Supreme Soviet), responded on August 19, 1990, with the establishment 
of the Gagauz Republic, an entity independent from Soviet Moldova but remaining 
a part of the Soviet Union. However, as John A. Webster [2007] convincingly argues, 
getting a territorial autonomy within Soviet, and then independent Moldova was still 
a principal aim of the Gagauz elites.
TERRITORIAL DIMENSION
A territorial issue was an open question from the beginning of the Gagauz national 
movement. While there had been no Gagauz territorial unit previously, or natural 
borders that could easily be incorporated, the Gagauz claim referred to Moldova’s 
five southern districts, namely Basarabeasca, Ceadîr-Lunga, Comrat, Taraclia, and 
Vulcănești, home to almost all of Moldova’s Gagauz (Table 1). During discussions 
on autonomy in 1989, the Gagauz came up with two basic proposals, albeit tentative 
[Sato 2009: 147–149]. The first concerned territories of all five districts. However, 
the problem was that the Gagauz comprised just 47.2% of that region’s entire pop-
ulation, constituting an absolute majority in only two districts: Ceadîr-Lunga and 
Comrat. To make the proposal more credible, the Gagauz even tried to convince 
the Bulgarians to support and join the autonomy; indeed, the prospect of creating 
a dualistic Gagauz-Bulgarian autonomous entity was once floated. However, the 
Bulgarians rejected these offers [SO, Sept. 23, 1989; SO, Nov. 14, 1989]. The second 
proposal involved about half of the territory across the five districts, where there was 
concentration of the Gagauz. One of its variants included localities where Gagauz 
had an absolute majority and, to ensure territorial continuity, some ethnically mixed 
villages. The Gagauz would constitute 78.2% of the population of such a region. 
Additionally, it was proposed that other places could freely join the autonomy should 
they wish [Kendigelian 2009: 159–165].
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Table 1. Ethnic composition of Moldova and its districts inhabited by the Gagauz in 1989
 Population
Area
Total Moldovans Russians Ukrainians Gagauz Bulgarians Others
thou. % thou. % thou. % thou. % thou. % thou. % thou. %




287.9 100 74.4 25.9 17.0 5.9 14.6 5.1 136.0 47.2 41.8 14.5 4.0 1.4
Basarabeasca 
district 44.3 100 20.0 45.0 5.1 11.6 2.9 6.7 13.4 30.2 2.1 4.7 0.8 1.8
Ceadîr-Lunga 
district 67.0 100 2.7 4.1 3.0 4.5 2.1 3.1 43.0 66.2 15.2 22.7 0.9 1.4
Comrat 
district 70.1 100 12.8 18.2 3.3 4.7 3.3 4.7 44.7 63.8 5.2 7.4 0.8 1.2
Taraclia 
district 44.8 100 7.0 15.7 3.0 6.7 3.6 8.1 12.3 27.5 18.0 40.2 0.8 1.8
Vulcănești 
district 61.6 100 32.0 51.9 2.5 4.1 2.7 4.3 22.5 36.5 1.3 2.2 0.6 1.0
Source: Nedelchuk [1992: 27].
The prevailing assertion made by researchers of the Gagauz Republic is that 
its territory was comprised of the five above-mentioned southern districts [Chinn, 
Roper 1995: 295; Crowther, Fedor 1995; King 1997: 751; Kubicek 2010: 291]. In 
reality, the region declared as the Gagauz Republic on August 19, 1990 comprised 
only those areas dominated by the Gagauz and that had expressed a desire to be part 
of the autonomy. Large parts of the Comrat and Ceadîr-Lunga districts were includ-
ed, along with more restricted areas of the Vulcănești, Basarabeasca and Taraclia 
districts (Map 1).5 The borders were largely regarded as provisional, as the Gagauz 
leadership hoped that other localities would join the Republic; no formal claims to 
include all five districts were made [Kendigelian 2015; Karakash 2015]. The territory 
of Gagauzia declared on August 19, 1990 can be regarded as generally coinciding 
with its actual territory, understood to be an area of the Gagauz authorities’ activities, 
such as holding elections and referenda. No borders were marked on the ground, just 
checkpoints on the main roads to the republic. It was not necessarily a unified area; 
indeed, Dareg A. Zabarah [2012: 187] called it “a loose conglomerate of villages”.
5 These were territories of 28 local soviets (out of the total of 64 within five southern districts 
[Moldavskaia SSR, 1988: 11, 14–15, 40–41, 76–77, 80]): Comrat, Bugeac, Congaz, Beșalma, Chirsova, 
Dezghingea, Congazcic, Ferapontievca, Sadîc (only the village of Taraclia), and Cotovscoe in the Comrat 
district; Ceadîr-Lunga, Tomai, Gaidar, Beșghioz, Baurci, Cazaclia, and Joltai in the Ceadîr-Lunga district; 
Vulcănești, Etulia, Chișmichioi, and Burlăceni in the Vulcănești district; Cioc-Maidan, Avdarma, and Chiri-
et-Lunga in the Basarabeasca district; Copceac, Svetlîi, Cealîc, and Budăi (only the village of Carbalia) in 
the Taraclia district [Panorama, Aug. 23, 1990]. Another source [Sovetskaia Moldova, Aug. 22, 1990] adds 
parts of the sixth district of Cahul, however, they did not take part in any activities of the Gagauz Republic 
and were not claimed by the Gagauz authorities later on. In addition, the area of the present Autonomous 
Territorial Unit of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri) is slightly smaller than the territory of the Gagauz Republic 
declared on August 19, 1990, while the Gagauz share of the total population is 82.1%.
121THE GAGAUZ REPUBLIC: INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF De FacTo STATEHOOD
Map 1. Declared territories of the Gagauz Republic and Transnistria in 1990
Source: Drawn by Jakub Pieńkowski on the basis of information from Panorama, Aug. 23, 1990, atlas Moldavskoi SSR 
[1990: 7] and Bomeshko [2010: 88].
MILITARY DIMENSION
Moldova attempted to put an end to the Gagauz Republic two months after the 
declaration of the separatist republic. This was directly linked with elections to the 
Gagauz Supreme Soviet to be held on October 28, 1990. Having no army at this 
time, the Moldovan government instead organised detachments of volunteers. Ac-
companied by police units, poorly-equipped volunteers moved on public buses to 
the Gagauz areas on October 25. In turn, the Gagauz had at their disposal a number 
of self-defence squads. They established roadblocks and dug ditches on the edges of 
the region and its localities, harnessing all available weapons including garden-forks, 
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metal bars, Molotov cocktails, fuel tanks and small arms. Crucially, they requested 
and received support from the Soviet airborne division, stationed in the city of Bol-
grad in Ukraine, as well as Transnistrian volunteers who came with a supply of arms. 
Additionally, Bulgarians from some neighbouring settlements blocked Moldovan 
detachments. At the same time, the Gagauz and Moldovan leaderships engaged in 
negotiations. All these prevented Moldovan irregulars from entering the Gagauz 
localities. A bloodbath was finally prevented by deployment, with the consent of 
both conflicting parties, of the Soviet Union’s internal troops on October 28, 1990.
In August 1991, Moldova made a further attempt to put an end to the Gagauz 
Republic, arresting Topal and Kendigelian on a charge of supporting the Moscow 
Putsch. However, they were released after a month. This, and other sabotage actions 
by Moldova, spurred the Gagauz leadership to establish a paramilitary unit, christened 
the Budjak Battalion, composed of several hundred guardsmen. Interestingly, it was 
formally registered as a security company under Soviet/Moldovan law. The Battalion 
was supplied with small arms and light weaponry by Transnistria from the depots of 
the 14th Soviet/Russian Army [Burgudzhi 2015; Kendigelian 2009: 297; Topal 2013: 
181–187]. Its commander, Ivan Burgudzhi [2015], claims that it also received human 
and material support from the Bolgrad airborne division. The Battalion’s tasks were as 
follows: defence against invasion, counter-sabotage, control of movement of people 
and goods into and out the Gagauz area, and protection of Republic’s authorities, 
institutions, and companies [Burgudzhi 2015; Kendigelian 2009: 297; Topal 2013: 
181–187]. While not robust, the Budjak Battalion successfully prevented Moldovan 
law enforcement (and government) officials from entering freely the Gagauz region 
and was an important factor in deterring Moldova from regaining control over the 
Gagauz area by force (although one may say that such a scenario was unlikely, mainly 
due to Moldova’s focus on growing tensions with Transnistria and, finally, losing 
a war with Transnistrian separatists in 1992). 
Interestingly, local police in the Gagauz region, who remained loyal to the Mol-
dovan authorities co-existed with the Budjak Battalion and the self-defence squads. 
On the one hand, the Gagauz leaders were distrustful of the police and feared that they 
could (perhaps violently) oppose the republic. Accordingly, they tried to subordinate 
the police, but failed mainly due to insufficient financial resources [Topal 2015; Pan-
orama, Mar. 24, 1992]. On the other hand, the local police did not wish to meddle in 
politics and focused instead on keeping public order. Moreover, had Moldova launched 
an armed operation against the Gagauz Republic, the local police might have sided 
with the latter. This could potentially have happened during the so-called “march of 
the volunteers” on the Gagauz areas that occurred in October 1990. The local police 
maintained neutrality, but had the Moldovan irregulars attacked the Gagauz settlements, 
officers may have forsaken their allegiance to the Moldovan authorities and defended 
their homes and families [Dudush 2015]. Despite the fact that there were tensions 
between the Budjak Battalion and the local police, they normally co-existed and some-
times actively cooperated [Burgudzhi 2015; Dudush 2015]. Both were dominated by 
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the Gagauz: the Battalion guardsmen and the police officers knew each other, coming 
as they did from small communities. Additionally, the Gagauz Republic authorities 
had to rely on the police with respect to keeping public order, as the Budjak Battalion 
was not suitable for such an activity [Dudush 2015].
The Budjak Battalion was additionally used to pressurise people reluctant to 
support the activities of Gagauzia’s authorities [Dobrov 2015; Neikovchen 2015]. 
While there were serious problems with subordination of this paramilitary formation, 
it did not try to undermine the authority of the Gagauz leadership. It is not without 
significance that its commander was simultaneously the head of the Internal Affairs 
Department of the Gagauz government, the outcome being that the Gagauz Republic 
enjoyed freedom from local strongmen.
POLITICAL DIMENSION
GAGAUZ REPUBLIC STATE INSTITUTIONS
The first institution of Gagauzia, set up on the day of its proclamation on August 
19, 1990, was the Provisional Committee on Establishment of the Gagauz Republic. 
It replaced a similar institution formed in December 1989 with the aim of estab-
lishing Gagauz autonomy within Soviet Moldova. The Provisional Committee held 
all powers until the Supreme Soviet was elected at the end of October 1990. While 
elections were originally set for October 28, they were moved to October 26 due to 
threats from Moldovan volunteers. Voters were not afraid and cast their ballots as 
early as the night of October 25. The Supreme Soviet assembled on October 30 and 
took power from the Provisional Committee. While the Gagauz took some steps to 
form a government soon after, the formal government-building process only launched 
in autumn 1991 [KV, Oct. 10, 1991; KV, July 6, 1992]. By early 1993 the newly 
formed Department of Education was able to take control of the public education 
departments of the Comrat, Ceadîr-Lunga, and Vulcănești districts [KV, Feb. 20, 
1993; Cheshmezhdi 2015; Savastin 2015].
The president of the Gagauz Republic was elected in December 1991. Interesting-
ly, there were discussions about whether the presidential office was needed at all. Its 
supporters, who finally won the debate, claimed that it would be a good opportunity 
to publicise the Gagauz cause and that the Republic needed a principal representative 
[KV, Nov. 5, 1991; Znamia, Nov. 28, 1991]. Indeed, it was the vice-president, Petr 
Buzadzhi, who led the Gagauz delegation to the commission that developed, together 
with Moldovan counterparts, a bill on the Gagauz autonomy within Moldova. The 
Gagauz may have also simply copied Moldova’s decision to elect a president in 
popular elections (they were taken on December 8, 1991). With the establishment of 
the presidential office, power was spread between the president and the parliament 
(and its chairman in the first place). Additionally, with the support of the Budjak 
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Battalion, the Gagauz set up their own executive committee in January 1993 in the 
Vulcănești district. This met with the legal Moldovan committee and took care of 
four Gagauz settlements located in the district [Savastin 2015; Panorama, Dec. 30, 
1993]. Thus, Gagauzia established its legislative and dual executive. It did not have 
its own judicature, but local law enforcement agencies that were subordinated to 
Moldova’s central authorities, just like the local police, did not interfere in politics.
Despite the establishment of the executives, the state institutions of the Gagauz 
Republic were not robust. This was admitted by the Gagauz elites themselves, while 
the greatest dissatisfaction was expressed in regard to the government; just three 
departments (internal affairs, education, and finance) were found to be functional 
[KV, Aug. 14, 1993]. The Gagauz deliberately delayed establishing state institutions 
in order to help stabilise relations with Moldova and to facilitate negotiations on 
legal recognition of the Republic by the Moldovan authorities [Kendigelian 2009: 
327]. Moreover, they did not know how to properly proceed with the business of 
institution-building. When elected to the presidential office, Topal underlined that 
he was just a novice politician and that the Gagauz leadership had never dealt with 
state-building [Znamia, Dec. 19, 1991]. This was more than two years after pro-
claiming the Gagauz autonomous republic within Moldova and almost a year and 
half after declaring the Gagauz Republic. Indeed, Topal and Kendigelian, the top 
two Gagauzian leaders, were respectively a director of a road construction company 
and a teacher of Russian. The Gagauz leadership also had a problem with recruiting 
specialists. Ilia Karakash, an Odessa-based scholar of Gagauz origin, emphasised the 
low intellectual powers of the local Gagauz regarding political and socio-economic 
issues related to the concept of territorial autonomy [Panorama, May 12, 1992]. 
He himself authored the 1990 declaration proclaiming the Gagauz Republic and 
the establishment of the local university, but many Gagauz from outside the region, 
including from Chișinău, were reluctant to support the Republic [Karakash 2015; 
see also King 1997: 746–747].
Last but not least, a significant problem hindering institution-building was that 
the Republic’s leadership had scarce financial resources at its disposal. Money came 
from voluntary donations made by ordinary people or worker teams, for example, 
for a day of their work [Znamia, Sept. 8, 1990; Znamia, June 11, 1991]. Donations 
were also given officially or unofficially (voluntarily or under duress) by collective 
farms (kolkhozes) and factories located in the Gagauz area. Substantial financial 
support came from Transnistria that additionally provided Gagauzia with goods such 
as cars, arms for the Budjak Battalion or paper for the official gazette [Kendigelian 
2015; Neikovchen 2015]. Contributions were also made by the local authorities of 
the Comrat and Ceadîr-Lunga districts: these were either donations (accepted, at least 
temporarily, by Moldova) marked as “other expenses” in their budgets, or for six 
months during 1993 as transfers to the regional budget of the Gagauz Republic [KV, 
Feb. 5, 1994; KV, Nov. 5, 1994]. Funds might also have been given to the region as 
cash or via private bank accounts by the Soviet Union/Russia and Turkey, respec-
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tively, via Tiraspol in Transnistria and Odessa in Ukraine [Neikovchen 2015]. All 
in all, the financial resources were barely enough to run the state apparatus and the 
Budjak Battalion. There were serious problems with paying salaries, with officials 
not receiving them for up to a year. 
SHARED LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS
The Gagauz Republic’s leadership recognised Moldova’s local administrative 
institutions as its own and tried to appropriate them to execute its decisions or at least 
to induce them to take some steps or coordinate their activities. These essentially 
concerned the soviets (councils) of people’s deputies and their executive committees 
of communities from the territory of Gagauzia and of two districts of Comrat and 
Ceadîr-Lunga. This was of great importance for the Republic due to the weakness 
of its government. What benefitted the Gagauz Republic was that local elections 
to soviets, held in early 1990, brought many activists or supporters of the Gagauz 
national movement to power, and some of them simultaneously served as the Re-
public’s officials. For example, the chairman and the deputy chairman of the Comrat 
District Soviet of People’s Deputies – Topal and Kendigelian, respectively – held 
the top offices in the Gagauz Republic. In addition, opponents of the Gagauz area’s 
separation from Moldova, especially in the early days, did not dare to go against 
the masses supporting the Gagauz Republic. If needed, guardsmen from the Budjak 
Battalion were used to enforce loyalty. Significantly, it was the deputies of the local 
soviets from the Gagauz area who declared the Gagauz Republic on August 19, 1990. 
In reality, however, Gagauzia shared control over the local administrative in-
stitutions with Moldova. Still recognising the region’s soviets and committees as 
its own, Moldova continued paying salaries to local officials and allocating money 
to local budgets. The local authorities struggled with deficits, and thus funds from 
the central budget was of crucial importance for the region. The only local institu-
tion fully subordinate to the Gagauz Republic’s authorities – the Gagauz executive 
committee in the Vulcănești district – had no money for transferral to the district’s 
communities and had to count on the legal committee’s fund [Savastin 2015]. The 
financial dependence of the local authorities was the most powerful factor in favour 
of their subordination to the Moldovan centre. The financial situation was different 
only between May and November 1993 in the case of the Comrat and Ceadîr-Lunga 
districts. They contributed to the regional budget of the Gagauz Republic while their 
financial ties with the central budget were loosened.6
6 On relations between local budgets of the Gagauz area and central budget of Moldova as well as on 
the budget of the Gagauz Republic see, for example, Znamia, Dec. 17, 1991; KV, Feb. 20, 1993; KV, Nov. 
13, 1993; KV, Jan. 29, 1994; KV, Nov. 5, 1994; Kendigelian [2009: 366–368]. While Sato [2009: 156] writes 
that the third district of Vulcănești joined the Gagauz Republic’s budget too, in fact, the Gagauz leadership 
did not attempt to include this district because it was dominated by Moldovans [Topal 2013: 113].
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Over time and with decreasing mobilisation of the masses, the unity of the Gagauz 
elites was more and more undermined. This worked against the Gagauz Republic 
[Angeli 2006: 158]. A long-time animosity between two centres of the Gagauz area – 
Comrat and Ceadîr-Lunga – made itself felt too. The Ceadîr-Lunga withdrawal from 
the Republic’s budget in November 1993 was an example of problems with unity 
among the Gagauz. Deputies from this district believed that their region financially 
subsidised the Comrat district and decided to stop doing this. The Gagauz Republic 
authorities blamed Bulgarians, who had a strong position in the Ceadîr-Lunga elites, 
and Moldova, which courted the local leadership by offering some benefits. The 
soviet of the Ceadîr-Lunga district also decided, against the will of the Republic’s 
authorities, that the district would unconditionally take part in Moldova’s parliamen-
tary elections to be held in early 1994 [Kendigelian 2015; Topal 2013: 113–115]. 
Additionally, moderates and pragmatists made their presence increasingly felt. 
These were, for example, Konstantin Taushanzhi and Leonid Dobrov (the chairmen of 
the Comrat district and Comrat city executive committees, respectively), and Dmitrii 
Kroitor (the chairman of the Ceadîr-Lunga District Executive Committee). Taushanzhi 
and Dobrov were in favour of reaching compromises with the Moldovan authorities 
and, in May 1991, came up with the first plan for Gagauz territorial autonomy within 
Moldova, which was highly criticised by the Gagauz Republic leadership. Kroitor 
was a principal figure behind the Ceadîr-Lunga district’s withdrawal from the budget 
of the Gagauz Republic in late 1993. In return, the district was supposed to get extra 
funds from Moldova for economic development. Finally, dual subordination of the 
local authorities either bred passivity of some of their representatives or gave some of 
them an opportunity to manoeuvre between Gagauzia’s and Moldova’s leaderships to 
their own benefit; both played against the Gagauz de facto state [KV, Nov. 7, 1991; 
KV, June 19, 1993]. In late 1993, Topal accused local committees of going against the 
Republic, and the local soviets of passivity. He tried to subordinate local administrative 
institutions, but soon gave up [KV, Nov. 27, 1993; KV, Feb. 12, 1994].
THE ExECUTION OF POWER
Largely due to under-development of the Gagauz Republic state institutions and 
a lack of full control over local administrative institutions, the majority of decisions 
made by the Gagauz authorities were not executed [Panorama, Jan. 31, 1991; KV, 
Feb. 29, 1992; Shornikov, Bulgar 2006: 417]. However, there were numerous instances 
where a broad consensus was reached between the leadership of the Gagauz Republic, 
the local authorities, and the region’s population. These cases largely concerned the 
preservation of the old, Soviet reality while preventing the formation of a new, Moldo-
van order; they also involved development of the region’s statehood and identity. For 
example, the Gagauz Republic’s leadership conducted elections for both its parliament 
and president while simultaneously refusing to participate in the election of Moldova’s 
president. Furthermore, in March 1991, it organised a referendum on the preservation 
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of the Soviet Union (a move officially banned in Moldova) and, in December 1991, 
another one on establishing a separate Gagauz Republic (however, supposed to create 
a federation or a confederation with republics of Moldova and Transnistria) within the 
reorganised Soviet Union (the Union of Sovereign States). It banned the Moldovan 
flag from being flown over local institutions and instead flew its own flag (and that of 
the Soviet Union, during its existence). It also prevented people from the Gagauz area 
being called up to the Moldovan army, promoted the dominant position of the Russian 
language while downplaying the Moldovan (Romanian) language, and formed its own 
regional budget for six months. As summed up by Viktor Grebenshchikov, a counsel-
or to the Moldovan president, the Gagauz region violated sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Moldova [Nezavisimaia Moldova, Feb. 23, 1993].
There were also issues about which the Gagauz demonstrated pragmatism. Al-
though they threatened to use physical force to take control over a radio station in 
Comrat during a politically tense period in August 1990 [Arabadzhi 2015], they later 
successfully cooperated with the Moldovan authorities to develop mass media, edu-
cation, and economic institutions fostering the Gagauz and regional identities. This is 
confirmed, for example, by Ilia Afanasev [2015], the founder and director of Comrat 
Television, who says that whilst he could have taken two men with guns and taken 
control of the TV tower, he instead went to the ministry in Chișinău to register the 
local television station properly. Another example concerns the regional university, 
launched in Comrat in February 1991 due to the combined efforts of Gagauz national 
movement activists and public donations. When parents of students protested that the 
qualifications would not be universally recognised, the Gagauz applied to the Moldo-
van Ministry of Education for formal registration of the university and ratification of 
the degrees [Varban 2015]. Similarly, the head of the Gagauz government Department 
of Education communicated with his Moldovan counterparts to establish a Gagauz 
national school employing Gagauz as the language of instruction (in this case without 
success), or for the ability to send a group of Gagauz students to universities in Turkey 
[Cheshmezhdi 2015]. Gagauzia also set up a regional bank in cooperation with the 
Moldovan National Bank, knowing that otherwise it could not function (although ini-
tially the Gagauz negotiated just with the authorities of the Soviet Union) [Kendigelian 
2015; Topal 2015]. These institutions were referred to as the greatest achievements of 
the Gagauz Republic when its third anniversary was celebrated [KV, Aug. 21, 1993].
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION
While Gagauzia was dominated by the Gagauz there were fears of prejudice – 
which was one of reasons why Bulgarians did not decide to join the Gagauz autonomy 
– so the Gagauz authorities pro-actively emphasised the principles of international-
ism. The rights of people of all ethnic backgrounds and nationalities were guaranteed 
in the August 1990 proclamation of the Gagauz Republic [Deklaratsiia 2014]. As 
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many as four languages (Bulgarian, Gagauz, Moldovan and Russian) were declared 
as official, though Russian still served as a lingua franca. All these measures were 
meant to maintain the Soviet ideal and contrast with Moldovan nationalism. Indeed, 
inter-ethnic relations were generally good. 
While remaining faithful to the idea of internationalism, the Gagauz Republic’s 
leadership nevertheless discreetly engaged in developing an identity that had been very 
weak until the end of the 1980s. For example, the flag, anthem, and coat of arms of the 
Republic were finally approved and national holidays supported. The Gagauz language 
was Latinised and terms such as bashkan (initially used for the mayor of Comrat and 
then for the governor of the autonomy) and Gagauzia or Gagauz Yeri (meaning a place 
where the Gagauz live) were coined at that time [Dobrov 2015; Taushanzhi 2015]. As 
has already been mentioned, a Gagauz university, television channel, and bank were 
also established. According to Alla Paptsova [2015], a (present-day) scholar from the 
Comrat State University, even these moderate activities were of crucial importance 
for the development of the Gagauz language and identity. 
Undoubtedly, internationalism and moderate “Gagauzation” – main elements of 
nation-building – were appreciated by the inhabitants of the Gagauz area and fostered 
unity and identification with the Gagauz Republic. Sufficed to say that turnout in the 
1991 presidential elections and associated referendum was 85.2%, in which more 
than 95% of voters supported Topal and the “independence of the Gagauz Republic 
within the political and economic Union of Sovereign States” [KV, Dec. 17, 1991]. 
At the same time, as Paptsova [2015] underlines, people did not perceive Gagauzia 
as a separate entity from Moldova, or the Gagauz leadership as an alternative to the 
central Moldovan authorities. A crucial point is that there was no bloodbath. After 
the October 1990 march of Moldovan volunteers to the Gagauz Republic, there were 
no further open confrontations with Moldova and the parties continued talking about 
conflict resolution; almost all ties were retained between the Gagauz area and the rest 
of Moldova [see also Angeli 2006: 78–80]. The idea of autonomism was undeniably 
popular, as demonstrated by a referendum taken in March 1994 when almost all 
voters were in favour of establishing a Gagauz ethno-territorial unit within Moldova 
(turnout was better than 90%, except in the Comrat district, where participation was 
only 78.3%) [KV, Mar. 12, 1994].
To the daily benefit of the Gagauz population, the region did not experience war 
and maintained financial and socio-economic ties with the rest of Moldova (except 
in 1993 when a Gagauz budget existed for a few months). Taxes collected in the 
Gagauz area were sent to the Moldovan central budget, from which funds were 
transferred back to local budgets. Services were co-funded or funded by Moldova 
and provided, as previously, by central or local institutions. People continued to 
receive pensions from the Moldovan central budget and could freely use hospitals 
in Chișinău. Some of these links were more or less accepted, while other were even 
welcomed. Gagauzia only had money for maintaining its own institutions and could 
only influence expenditure of localised budgets for administrative purposes.
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However, as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moldova suffered an 
economic breakdown, one of the most significant among the post-Soviet republics. The 
standard of living drastically dropped in Moldova, including in the Gagauz area, and 
the problem of wage arrears was common. While the Gagauz Republic’s authorities 
did not have the instruments to tackle the crisis, they themselves and the Republic 
were blamed for the problems. The leadership was accused of inactivity, money fraud 
and over-spending on the Republic’s institutions, resulting in a price increase of basic 
necessities [KV, Jan. 11, 1992; KV, Oct. 29, 1994]. Additionally, due to weakened 
law-enforcement agencies in the collapsing Soviet Union and the emerging independent 
Moldova, crime rates increased substantially. Gagauzia tried, but failed, to cope with 
this problem. Moreover, individual guardsmen from the Budjak Battalion intimidated 
civilians [Panorama, Mar. 17, 1992; KV, Oct. 3, 1992], and some were themselves 
involved in criminal activities [Neikovchen 2015; Dudush 2015].
Topal complained that the Gagauz started their struggle for self-determination 
when people had had a decent life under the Soviet Union, although this soon changed 
and worsened the situation of the Republic [KV, Nov. 27, 1993]. Indeed, as a result 
of the economic crisis, people became tired with the region’s undetermined status. 
They increasingly desired stabilisation and the striking of a deal with Moldova, the 
more so as Moldovan nationalists lost much of their influence after losing the war 
with Transnistria in mid-1992 and were finally ousted from power in the aftermath 
of the parliamentary elections in early 1994 [Karakash 2015; Lazarev 2015; Dobrov 
2015]. The impact of the negative socio-economic situation was so deep that Topal 
and Kendigelian lost the first elections for the bashkan (governorship) of the Gagauz 
autonomy in 1995. The winner was Georgii Tabunshchik, a former first secretary 
of the Communist Party in the Comrat district. An opponent to the Gagauz national 
movement, Tabunshchik was remembered by voters as a good, Soviet administrator 
and represented a direct association with the prosperous Soviet past.
CONCLUSIONS
Examination of the domestic dimensions of Gagauzia’s de facto statehood allows 
the results of state consolidation efforts undertaken by Gagauzia’s leadership to be 
defined and reveals a nuanced picture. On the one hand, the Gagauz Republic’s 
authorities failed to subordinate law-enforcement agencies and local administrative 
institutions functioning in the Gagauz area. The former remained loyal to Moldova’s 
central authorities, while control over the latter was shared between the Gagauz and 
Moldovan leaders. This makes the case of Gagauzia extraordinary, given that other 
de facto states managed to expel representatives of parent states from most of the 
territory which they claim (but they may have a problem with taking control of some 
parts of their territory like the case of Abkhazia and the Georgian/Mingrelian-pop-
ulated Gali region – Blakkisrud, Kolstø [2012: 282–284]). In addition, Gagauzia’s 
MARCIN KOSIENKOWSKI130
territory was not necessarily a unified area. Its own governing and military institu-
tions were not robust and the majority of decisions made by the Gagauz authorities 
were not executed. Over time, unity among elites and the population’s support for 
the Gagauz de facto state decreased. 
On the other hand, however, the Gagauz leadership exerted military control over 
Gagauzia’s territory comprising parts of Moldova’s five southern districts. Decisions 
that were implemented, relating mainly to political and identity issues, were of great 
importance to Moldova because they substantially hindered the formation of its in-
dependent statehood. The Gagauz elites and population were generally unanimous 
in demanding their own (legalised) ethno-territorial unit, while Moldova was able 
to reintegrate the Gagauz area only when the Gagauz authorities agreed to a deal. 
Another identified problem is that Gagauzia was dependent on Moldova in terms 
of finances and services. This is another outstanding feature of the Gagauz Republic. 
Whereas some de facto states rely on their parent states – arguably, the most prom-
inent example is Transnistria (having an export-oriented economy) whose ability to 
trade legally with the outside world depends on Moldova [Blakkisrud, Kolstø 2011: 
190–191] – such a dependency is limited [Caspersen 2012: 65–68]. In point of fact, 
Gagauzia was dependent on Moldova to such an extent that people did not perceive 
Gagauzia as completely separate from Moldova.
However, economic dependency and people’s perception were not problematic, 
given that the Gagauz Republic strived for territorial autonomy within Moldova 
(and this is another distinctive feature, given that de facto states usually strive for 
independence or joining another state). Accordingly, some ties were more or less 
accepted, whereas others were embraced by the Gagauz authorities. Moreover, the 
Gagauz leadership itself sought cooperation with the Moldovan authorities to set 
up and develop regional non-political institutions such as a university, a television 
service and a bank. Their establishment was seen as one of most important achieve-
ments of the Gagauz de facto state (along with formation of governing institutions 
and finally getting territorial autonomy within Moldova). In its turn, Moldova was 
responsive to the Gagauz proposals, hoping that striking a deal with Gagauzia would 
help to resolve a conflict with its another breakaway region of Transnistria.
Furthermore, while other de facto states are generally not dependent on their 
parent states, they may rely on an external power. Being heavily dependent on sub-
sidies from a patron (which Gagauzia did not have), the present Eurasian de facto 
states are a case in point [Ó Beacháin et al. 2016: 443]. For example, Russia supplies 
Transnistria’s highly industrialised economy with natural gas free of charge as well 
as funds almost entire South Ossetia’s budget. Striving for separation from their 
parent states, Eurasian de facto states accept or even welcome this dependency on 
a patron; as a matter of fact, they would not be able to survive without economic 
support and security guarantees provided by their patron [Blakkisrud, Kolstø 2012: 
290–291]. In general terms, all these somehow reflect Gagauzia’s economic reliance 
on and strategy toward Moldova.
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If compared to other de facto states, it can be said that Gagauzia scored better in 
state consolidation than Chechnya (1996–1999) and the Republika Srpska Krajina 
(RSK) (1991–1995). The former was “an example of a largely anarchic entity domi-
nated by infighting warlords” [Caspersen 2012: 21], whereas leadership of the latter 
“rather than build[ing] strong state institutions (...) pilfered the state and allowed 
the society to slide into anarchy [and] never made any attempt to create a sense of 
separate RSK identity linked to the state” [Kolstø, Paukovic 2013: 309]. In addition, 
while the RSK was completely disbanded when absorbed into Croatia, the Gagauz 
region was granted autonomy within Moldova; thus, experience gained by the Gagauz 
elites during the existence of the de facto state of Gagauzia has been used by them 
in developing the newly created Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia (Gagauz 
Yeri) [Żyromski, Hatłas 2008].
Ultimately, therefore, it can be said that Gagauzia’s leaders were moderately 
successful in consolidating Gagauzia’s statehood through processes of state- and 
nation-building. As stated by Mariia Marunevich [2003: 172], one of the leaders of 
the Gagauz national movement, the Gagauz Republic allowed ideas of consolidation 
and rebirth of the Gagauz nation to be successfully tested and the first-ever Gagauz 
government structures to be established. It should be added, however, that state- and 
nation-building resources were running low during the last period of the Gagauz 
Republic’s existence. It is likely that if Moldova had delayed matters for a year, 
then the Gagauz elites would have been so divided and people’s mobilisation would 
have been so low that it would not need to grant territorial autonomy to Gagauz 
[Popozoglo 2015; Topal 2015].
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